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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-2153 
___________ 
 
ONYX INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., A Risk Retention Group, 
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND INSURANCE DIVISION 
(DOBI); KENNETH E. KOBYLOWSKI, COMMISSIONER OF DOBI;  
NEW JERSEY PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION 
(NJPLIGA) (joined for discovery purposes only) 
___________________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. No. 3:15-cv-03469) 
District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp 
___________________________________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on June 13, 2017 
 
Before: JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges, and STEARNS, District Judge.* 
 
(Opinion filed: August 8, 2017) 
____________ 
 
OPINION** 
____________ 
                                              
* The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Judge for the District 
of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Onyx Insurance Company, Inc. appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of 
Onyx’s complaint alleging that it was wrongfully denied participation in a New Jersey 
fund responsible for making personal injury payments to uninsured pedestrians involved 
in motor vehicle accidents.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. Background 
 Under New Jersey law, pedestrians involved in motor vehicle accidents may seek 
personal injury benefits from their own motor vehicle insurance carriers, or, if they are 
uninsured, from New Jersey’s Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 39:6-86.7, 39:6A-4.  The Fund is administered by the New Jersey Property-Liability 
Insurance Guaranty Association, a nonprofit organization created by the New Jersey 
Legislature and regulated by New Jersey’s Commissioner of Banking and Insurance.  See 
id. §§ 17:30A-5, 17:30A-6, 17:30A-6.1, 17:30A-9.  By statute, the Association is 
comprised of “member insurers” against whom the Association assesses payments to 
cover its obligations, such as its duty to make personal injury payments from the Fund to 
uninsured pedestrians.  See id. §§ 17:30A-5, 17:30A-8; see also id. § 17:30A-2. 
Onyx, however, is a “risk retention group” governed by the federal Liability Risk 
Retention Act of 1986 (“LRRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3906.  Onyx provides liability 
insurance and reinsurance and is organized to “assum[e] and spread[] . . . the liability 
exposure of its group members,” which include taxis registered in New Jersey.  Id. 
§ 3901(a)(4)(A).  Contending that the New Jersey statutory scheme wrongly excluded 
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Onyx from participating in the Fund and did so in a manner that discriminated against 
risk retention groups in violation of the LRRA, Onyx brought suit against the 
Association, New Jersey’s Department of Banking and Insurance, and the Department’s 
commissioner.  Onyx sought a declaratory judgment directing the defendants to permit 
Onyx to take part in the Fund, and it also sought reimbursement for “all paid claims” 
Onyx had incurred for pedestrian personal injury coverage.  App. 40.  The District Court 
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), and this timely appeal followed. 
II. Jurisdiction 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1   
III. Standard of Review 
 In reviewing the District Court’s dismissal of Onyx’s complaint pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6), our review is plenary.  McMullen v. Maple Shade Twp., 643 F.3d 96, 98 
(3d Cir. 2011).  We accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint, 
                                              
1 The Department of Banking and Insurance has urged that this case is moot 
because the Department issued a June 30, 2015 order that denied Fund payments for all 
commercial pedestrian personal injury claims (not just those involving risk retention 
groups), required all commercial motor vehicle insurers to include coverage for 
pedestrian claims, and thereby diminished the merit of Onyx’s assertion of discriminatory 
treatment toward risk retention groups.  We conclude, however, that Onyx retains “a 
personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit” based, at the very least, on its claim for 
reimbursement of pedestrian claims it has previously paid.  Campbell-Ewald Co. v. 
Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016) (quoting Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 
S. Ct. 1523, 1528 (2013)).  Accordingly, the Department’s June 30, 2015 order does not 
deprive this Court of jurisdiction. 
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viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Santomenno ex rel. John 
Hancock Tr. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co. (U.S.A.), 677 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 2012), 
and we will affirm if the plaintiff failed to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
IV. Discussion 
Onyx advances three arguments on appeal, which we address seriatim.  First, 
Onyx asserts that the LRRA preempts New Jersey state law and that the defendants must 
therefore allow Onyx to pay into and receive benefits from the Fund.  But although Onyx 
argues that the LRRA mandates that New Jersey allow risk retention groups to participate 
in state-established mechanisms “for the equitable apportionment among insurers of 
liability insurance losses and expenses,” the LRRA in fact states that “any state may 
require . . . a [risk retention] group to . . . participate” in such a mechanism.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 3902(a)(1)(C) (emphasis added).  Far from mandating that states allow risk retention 
groups to participate in equitable apportionment mechanisms, the LRRA merely gives 
states the option to do so—an option that New Jersey has declined to exercise.2 
Second, Onyx contends that its exclusion from the Fund was discriminatory and 
therefore in violation of the LRRA provision providing that, if a state exercises its option 
                                              
2 To the extent Onyx asserts that, even if federal and state statutes prevent it from 
participating in the Association, see 15 U.S.C. § 3902(a)(2); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:47A-9, 
Onyx should nonetheless be allowed to participate only in the Fund and not in the 
Association, such a Fund-only participation status simply does not exist under New 
Jersey law, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:30A-5, and, particularly given our analysis of Onyx’s 
discrimination allegation below, the LRRA does not require New Jersey to create such a 
status, see generally 15 U.S.C. § 3902. 
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to require risk retention groups to participate in a mechanism for equitable apportionment 
of insurance losses and expenses, then the state must do so “on a nondiscriminatory 
basis.”  15 U.S.C. § 3902(a)(1)(C).  But Onyx’s contention is premised on the mistaken 
notion that the LRRA mandates that New Jersey allow risk retention groups to participate 
in the Fund.  And even assuming the LRRA embodies a congressional intent to prohibit 
discriminatory treatment of risk retention groups as compared to other kinds of insurers, 
the statute clearly limits that intent to specific kinds of state regulation.  See id. 
§ 3902(a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C), (a)(4), (c).  Thus, we agree with the District Court and with 
the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division, both of which rejected the contention 
that New Jersey’s insurance scheme impermissibly discriminates against risk retention 
groups, see Am. Int’l Ins. Co. of Del. v. 4M Interprise, Inc., 70 A.3d 757, 762-64 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).   
As the Appellate Division explained, New Jersey’s dissimilar treatment of risk 
retention groups and other insurers represents the “trade-off” for risk retention groups: 
“[I]n exchange for limited State regulation,” risk retention groups are not permitted 
membership in insolvency guaranty associations, such as the Association here.  Id. at 
763-64 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Congress expressly intended risk retention 
groups to be treated differently from other insurers in manifold situations, as exemplified 
in the LRRA’s statutory exemptions for risk retention groups from “State law[s], rule[s], 
regulation[s], or order[s].”  15 U.S.C. § 3902(a).3  Because disparate treatment of risk 
                                              
3 Indeed, federal law prohibits states from allowing risk retention groups such as 
Onyx “to participate in any insurance insolvency guaranty association to which an insurer 
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retention groups is permissible absent an express LRRA prohibition—and because in 
many instances disparate treatment is required under the LRRA, see id.—the District 
Court properly rejected Onyx’s claim of discrimination based on Onyx’s exclusion from 
the Association and from the Fund. 
Finally, pointing to the complaint’s mention of the Department of Banking and 
Insurance’s shifting positions regarding risk retention groups’ obligations to uninsured 
pedestrians, Onyx argues that, because the Department’s various positions amount to an 
admission of discriminatory practices and because the complaint therefore satisfies the 
Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard, the District Court should have permitted discovery to 
proceed.  However, as discussed above, the District Court correctly dismissed the 
complaint as a matter of law, so discovery here would merely be “a fishing expedition” 
for facts to support a “speculative pleading of a case.”  Zuk v. E. Pa. Psychiatric Inst. of 
the Med. Coll., 103 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 1996).  We therefore agree with the District 
Court’s decision not to allow this case to proceed to discovery. 
V. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the Order of the District Court 
dismissing Onyx’s complaint.  
                                                                                                                                                  
licensed in the State is required to belong” (such as the Association here), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 3902(a)(2), and thus Onyx is not one of the Association’s member insurers, see 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:47A-9.  This provides an independent reason Onyx’s arguments fail, 
because instead of making payments into the Fund, which would then disburse any 
necessary personal injury payments to uninsured pedestrians, Onyx is required by statute 
to cover personal injury payments to uninsured pedestrians in its liability insurance 
policies.  See id. §§ 17:28-1.3, 39:6A-4. 
